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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN RE: 
REVOCATION OF BEER AND LIQUOR 
LICENSE AND BUSINESS REVENUE 
LICENSE 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THE CLUB, THE ALAMO, LIQUID 
ASSETS, INC., THE CLUB/449 MAIN, 
FOUR FORTY-NINE, a non-profit 
corporation, THERESE M. LAWTON, 
KEITH BRONSTEIN, ANNE ALLENDE, 
MIKE STEMLER, BILL DAHLQUIST, 
CHRIS JAMES, SONNY SUNDQUIST, 
DOUG WATCHHORN, and any other 
person claiming a management or 
ownership interest in the above 
mentioned establishments or 
organizations, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of the 
Club/Alamo's 1 appeal of "The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order By The Park City Council" (hereinafter cited as 
"Ruling") entered by the Park City Council in a license revocation 
proceeding. 
1 
For convenience, appellants in this appeal will be referred 
to throughout this brief as the "Club/Alamo," the private clubs 
that were the subject of the license revocation proceeding in Park 
City that gives rise to this appeal. 
Case No. 890517-CA 
Category No. 14b 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (b) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the district 
court erred in dismissing the Club/Alamo's appeal of the decision 
of the Park City Council in a license revocation proceeding 
initiated against the Club/Alamo by Park City. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant text of constitutional and statutory provisions 
pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on appeal is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In June 1988, the City Manager of Park City, through the City 
Manager Designee, Larry R. Keller, initiated proceedings before 
the Park City Council under certain ordinances of Park City 
(hereafter "City") to revoke the liquor and beer licenses and 
business licenses issued by the City to the Club/Alamo for the 
year 1988. (R. 301-305) 
The Council referred the matter to a licensed hearing 
examiner, A. Robert Thurman, for the taking of evidence and the 
preparation of recommended findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, and a recommended order. After the receipt of evidence, 
submission of briefs, and presentation of oral argument, the 
hearing examiner filed his recommendations with the Council on 
February 13, 1989 (R. 600 at pp. 1-28). He ultimately recommended 
2 
dismissal of the revocation action against the Club/Alamo (R. 600 
at pp. 23-28). 
After receiving a motion to dismiss from the Club/Alamo and 
additional briefing and oral argument from the parties, and upon 
considering the hearing examiner's recommendations, the Council 
issued its findings of fact/ conclusions of law, and order on 
March 9, 1989. Ruling (R. 55-64) (a copy of which is contained in 
Appendix A ) . Although the Council, lf[b]ased on equitable 
considerations and on the feeling that no useful purpose would be 
served by levying sanctions against the [Club/Alamo]," dismissed 
the "Order to Show Cause" filed against those establishments, it 
ruled that the Club/Alamo were in violation of certain of the 
liquor/beer license and business license ordinances. Ruling at 7-
10 (R. 61-64). Specifically, the Council ruled that the 
Club/Alamo had violated P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 6.01(b)2, which 
provides: 
Licenses i s sued under t h i s ordinance may be 
suspended or revoked by the City Council for 
the following reasons: 
(b) The l icensee or employees of the 
l i c e n s e e have been c o n v i c t e d or 
p l e a d [ s i c ] g u i l t y to v i o l a t i o n s 
occurring under Section 7.01 of t h i s 
o rd inance on the l icensed premise, 
n o t i n c l u d i n g v i o l a t i o n s by 
pa t rons [ . ] 
2 
Citations to "P.C. Ordin." are to the ordinances of Park City. 
3 
Section 7.01 sets forth conduct that constitutes "Offenses of 
Licensee," which are punishable as a class B misdemeanor, see 83-
16 § 7.03,. It also ruled that the Club/Alamo had violated P.C. 
Ordin. 87-12 § 15(3), which provides that the City Council may 
suspend or revoke a business license if the City Council finds 
that "the business is a front for or the site of illegal 
activity" (the full text of the pertinent portion of § 15 is 
contained in Appendix B). 
The Club/Alamo then filed an appeal from the Councilfs ruling 
in district court 3 (R. 1-52). In that appeal, the Club/Alamo 
argued that (1) the Council did not have the authority to perform 
the administrative function of license revocation; (2) the Park 
City ordinances regulating the service, sale, and storage of 
liquor by a "private club" are invalid on the ground of preemption 
by state law; (3) the Council erroneously found the Club/Alamo in 
violation of P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 6.01(b) by construing that 
provision in a manner inconsistent with its plain language; (4) 
P.C. Ordin. 87-12 § 15(3) is unconstitutionally vague, or, 
alternatively, is constitutional only if construed and applied in 
the manner suggested by the hearing examiner; and (5) the 
Council's treatment of "The Club" and "The Alamo" as a single 
3 
The Utah Court of Appeals no longer has primary appellate 
jurisdiction over appeals from the final orders of local agencies 
in adjudicative proceedings. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (a) (Supp. 1989) with former Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) 
(1987) . The district court conducts the initial review in such 
cases, and this Court reviews the district court's decision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b) (Supp. 1989). 
4 
business entity for purposes of the license revocation proceeding, 
even though separate beer and liquor licenses and business 
licenses are issued to each by the Cityf violated Park City's 
ordinances and denied the licensees equal protection of the law 
(R. 21-51). The City responded by filing a motion to dismiss the 
appeal (R. 556-564), The district court granted the City's 
motion, ruling that the court nlack[ed] jurisdiction of the appeal 
for the reason that appellants lack standing to appeal and that 
the issues sought to be raised on appeal herein are moot" (R. 582-
583) (a copy of the district court's order is contained in 
Appendix C). 
The Club/Alamo filed the instant appeal from the district 
court's order dismissing their appeal (R. 585). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are contained in the 
Statement Of The Case, above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because the Club/Alamo were aggrieved by the Council's order, 
they were properly before the district court on appeal pursuant to 
the applicable Park City ordinances. 
Alternatively, the district court had jurisdiction to review 
the Council's unlawful actions under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(2). 
Finally, because the requested judicial relief can affect the 
rights of the Club/Alamo, their appeal to the district court 
should not have been dismissed as moot* 
5 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
CLUB/ALAMO'S APPEAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION; 
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL, 
WHICH RAISED ISSUES THAT WERE NOT MOOT, UNDER 
P.C. ORDIN. 83-16 § 6,01m. AND P.C. ORDIN. 87-
12 § 15, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, UNDER UTAH R. CIV. 
P. 65B(b)(2). 
When filing their initial appeal in the district court, the 
Club/Alamo asserted as a basis for appellate jurisdiction in that 
court the provisions of P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 6.01m. and P.C. Ordin. 
87-12 § 15, or, alternatively, Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (2) (R. 2-
3) . The district court rejected those bases for jurisdiction, 
accepting the City's argument that the Club/Alamo lacked appellate 
standing because they were not "licensee[s] aggrieved by an Order 
of the City Council," as required by 83-16 § 6.01m and 87-12 § 15, 
and because Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(2) could not be used as a 
substitute for seeking review of the case by a declaratory 
judgment action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. 
(1987) 4 (a copy of the City's memorandum in support of its motion 
to dismiss is contained in Appendix D) . The court's conclusion, 
like the City's arguments on this point, was founded on an 
4 
Although the district court's order does not articulate the 
City's arguments as grounds for the court's conclusion that the 
Club/Alamo lacked standing to appeal, it is clear from the minute 
entry the court issued prior to its signing of the order prepared 
by the City that the court had adopted the City's arguments in 
their entirety. See Minute Entry (R. 580) ("The Court grants 
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss for reasons advanced by the Appellee 
Park City Municipal Corp."). Therefore, subsequent references in 
this brief to the district court's conclusions are necessarily 
also references to the arguments advanced by the City in the 
district court. 
6 
unreasonably narrow construction of the pertinent Park City 
ordinances and a failure to recognize traditional avenues of 
appellate review of administrative decisions. 
P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 6.01m. 5 provides: 
Any licensee aggrieved by an Order of the City 
Council entered pursuant to this section may 
maintain an action for relief therefrom in any 
court of competent jurisdiction, where said 
court deems itself the appropriate forum for 
the appeal from the City Council's action. 
The licensee shall be required to follow 
orders and procedures of the appropriate court 
with regard to time for filing. 
A similarly worded provision is contained in P.C. Ordin. 87-12 § 
15, the Park City ordinance dealing with the revocation and 
suspension of business licenses issued by the City. Central to 
the district court's conclusion that the Club/Alamo lacked 
appellate standing is the claim that they were not "aggrieved" by 
the "Order of the City Council." It accepted the City's position 
that the Club/Alamo received in the Council's order everything 
they requested—i.e., a dismissal of the action—and thus, as a 
"prevailing" party, were not entitled to appeal under the Park 
City ordinances. Such a position ignores the basis upon which the 
Council issued its order of dismissal and argues for an 
unreasonably narrow construction of the terms "aggrieved" and 
"Order" as used in 83-16 § 6.01m and 87-12 § 15. 
5 
P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 6.01 deals with the suspension and 
revocation of liquor and beer licenses issued by the City. 
Section 6.01m specifically addresses appellate review of an order 
of the City under section 6.01. 
7 
Although the Club/Alamo admittedly received the dismissal 
they requested, that dismissal was not grounded on factual and 
legal conclusions exonerating the licensees of guilt, but rather 
on the Council's "equitable considerations and . . . feeling that 
no useful purpose v/ould be served by levying sanctions against the 
establishments known as 'The Club1 and 'The Alamo' . . . ." 
Ruling at 9 (emphasis added). The Council specifically found that 
the Club/Alamo were in violation of P.C. Ordin. 83-16 §6.01(b) and 
P.C. Ordin. 87-12 § 15 and were therefore subject to sanctions, 
Ruling at 7-8, 9; however, it decided not to impose sanctions for 
those violations. In conjunction with its conclusion that the 
Club/Alamo were guilty of the violations just described, the 
Council concluded that it f,ha[d] jurisdiction over the parties and 
the subject matter involved in this revocation proceeding." 
Ruling at: 7. On each of these points, the Council plainly 
rejected contrary arguments advanced by the Club/Alamo. 
With the foregoing in mind, the meaning of the term "Order" 
as used in 83-16 § 6.01m. and 87-12 § 15 may now be addressed. 
Contrary to the view the City and the district court apparently 
adopted, "Order" cannot reasonably be read to include only the 
"bare-bones" order issued by the Council (i.e., dismissal of the 
action) . An "Order" necessarily encompasses all the pertinent 
factual and legal conclusions that underpin the ultimate result 
reached by the Council. To interpret "Order" in the extremely 
narrow fashion proposed by the City and the court would strip the 
Council's decision of its essential elements and result in an 
8 
insulation from judicial review that could not have been intended 
by the drafters of the pertinent ordinances. 
As for the term "aggrieved/' the court also adopted an 
unreasonably narrow construction. It essentially concluded that/ 
because the Club/Alamo did not suffer any sanctions concerning 
their beer and liquor licenses and business licenses, they were 
not "aggrieved" by the Council's order, and that a sanction must 
have been imposed against a party by the Council's order before 
that party may seek judicial review under 83-16 § 6.01m. or 87-12 
§ 15. 
The term "aggrieved" is not defined in either ordinance. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to construe 
language similar to that at issue here. In noting that a sheriff, 
whose decision to discharge one of his deputies had been reversed 
by the Merit Commission, enjoyed a statutory right to appeal the 
Commission's reversal under Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-20 (1987) , the 
Court said: 
An "aggrieved par ty" must be both a par ty to 
the proceeding and one who is prejudiced or 
a f f e c t e d by the order . The sher i f f in t h i s 
c a s e was c l e a r l y an aggr ieved p a r t y . He 
d i s c h a r g e d D e p u t y J o n e s . The M e r i t 
Commission's o rder r e i n s t a t i n g Deputy Jones 
a f fec t s the she r i f f , as he and his department 
would be requi red to work with a person the 
sher i f f apparently believed was not qual i f ied 
to serve as a deputy she r i f f . The sher i f f had 
a s t a t u t o r y r igh t to appeal . 
Mat ter of Discharge of J o n e s , 720 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah 1986) 
( c i t a t i ons omi t ted) . Applying tha t de f in i t i on of "aggrieved" to 
the ins t an t case , along with the proper const ruct ion of the term 
9 
"Order" discussed above, the Club/Alamo were clearly -aggrieved by 
the Council's order which included rulings adverse to the 
Club/Alamo on the issues of jurisdiction, preemption, construction 
of pertinent ordinances, and guilt concerning alleged violations 
of the beer/liquor and business licensing ordinances—matters that 
are central to the propriety of the entire revocation proceeding 
against the licensees. The adverse actions of the Council plainly 
affected the Club/Alamo's legal rights, such that the Club/Alamo 
can be fairly considered "licensee[s] aggrieved by an Order of the 
City Council" under 83-16 § 6.01m. and 87-12 § 15. This 
construction is consistent with the principles of statutory 
interpretation this Court recently applied in construing a city 
ordinance in Salem City v. Farnsworth# 753 P.2d 514 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the 
Club/Alamo's appeal on the ground that they lacked appellate 
standing under the relevant Park City ordinances. 
Second, the city and the district court devoted little 
attention to the Club/Alamo's alternative claim of jurisdiction 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (2) . It is well established lav; in 
Utah that, where there is no statute or ordinance specifically 
authorizing judicial review, a party may seek relief from 
arbitrary or unlawful local agency action under Rule 65B(b)(2). 
See, e.g., DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 764 P.2d 
627, 628 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). That is precisely what the 
Club/Alamo sought in their appeal. Neither the City nor the court 
offered anything to demonstrate why jurisdiction would not, in the 
10 
alternative, lie in the district court under Rule 65B(b)(2) as 
explained in DeBry. And, contrary to what the City and the court 
apparently believed, nothing in either Rule 65B(b)(2), § 78-33-1 
et seq.i or the relevant case law even suggests that the 
Club/Alamo were required to pursue a declaratory judgment action 
rather than seek review under Rule 65B(b)(2). Indeed, in McRae & 
DeLand v. Feltch, 669 P.2d 404, 406 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court made clear that the appropriate procedure for challenging 
the jurisdiction of a lower tribunal — an issue central to the 
instant case—is not a declaratory judgment action, but rather is 
a petition for extraordinary relief under Rule 653(b)(2). 
Moreover, although there does not appear to be a Utah appellate 
decision directly on point, it is widely held that a declaratory 
relief action is not the appropriate vehicle for review of an 
administrative decision when there exists a procedure to appeal 
from an administrative ruling. See, e.g., Tanner Companies v. 
Arizona State Land Dept., 142 Ariz. 183, 688 P.2d 1075, 1079-80 
(Ariz. App. 1984), and cases cited therein; Ricks Exploration v. 
Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 695 P.2d 498, 502 (Okl. 1984); Selby 
Realty Co. v. City of Buenaventura, 10 Cal.3d 110, 109 Cal. Rptr. 
799, 514 P.2d 111, 122 (1973). 
Finally, the district court's mootness finding misunderstood 
both the nature and significance of the relief sought by the 
Club/Alamo. Their appeal sought reversal of the Council's order 
on the issues of jurisdiction, preemption, and construction and 
application of the pertinent ordinances. This relief clearly can 
11 
affect the Club/Alamo's right to be free from the collateral 
consequences that could flow from the Council's rulings that the 
Club/Alamo had violated 83-16 § 6.01(b) and 87-12 § 15(3)—for 
examplef those rulings obviously could affect the Club/Alamo's 
ability to renew their beer/liquor licenses (see P.C. Ordin. 83-16 
§ 5.11(d) 6) or to defend themselves in a future action for 
business license suspension or revocation brought under 87-12 § 
15(3) ("front for or the site of illegal activity" provision). A 
case is deemed moot only when the requested relief cannot affect 
the rights of the litigants. See Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 
42, 44 (Utah 1989). Clearly, as just noted, the Club/Alamo's 
rights would be significantly affected if the district court were 
to grant the requested relief. Cf. Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 
166, 167 n.l (Utah 1981) (discussing collateral consequences 
exception to the mootness doctrine in criminal context). 
Therefore, that court erred in dismissing the Club/Alamofs appeal 
as moot. 
6 
P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 5.11(d) provides in pertinent part: 
. . . . 
Licenses shall be renewed unless the Council shall find that: 
. . . 
(d) The l i c e n s e e or his employees or agents have been 
conv ic ted of or p lead [ s i c ] g u i l t y to more than five (5) 
v io l a t i ons of t h i s ordinance or Sta te l iquor control s ta tu tes 
r e l a t i v e to the conduct of the l icensed premises in a single 
calendar year preceding the renewal, not including violationby patrons. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Club/Alamo were aggrieved by the Council's order, 
they were properly before the district court on appeal pursuant to 
the applicable Park City ordinances. Alternatively/ the district 
court had jurisdiction to reviev; the Council's unlawful actions 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(2) . Finally, because the requested 
judicial relief can significantly affect the rights of the 
Club/Alamo, the lower court should not have dismissed their appeal 
as moot. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's 
order of dismissal and remand the case to that court to conduct 
review of the Council's ruling as requested by the Club/Alamo. 
/A-—-
RESPECTFULLY submitted this i^2_Z7day of December, 1989. 
David B. Thompson fl 
Attorney for Appellants 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
BEFORE THE CITY COUNCIL OF PARK CITY, UTAH 
IN RE: REVOCATION OF BEER 
AND LIQUOR LICENSE AND 
BUSINESS REVENUE LICENSE 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATION, 
Petitioner 
v. 
THE CLUB, THE ALAMO, LIQUID 
ASSETS, INC., THE CLUB/449 
MAIN, FOUR FORTY NINE, A NON-
PROFIT CORP., THERESE M. 
LAWTON, KEITH BRONSTEIN, ANN 
ALLENDE, MIKE STEMLER, BILL 
DAHLQUIST, CHRIST JAMES, 
SONNY SUNDQUIST, DOUG 
WATCHORN, AND ANY OTHER ) 
PERSONS CLAIMING A MANAGE-
MENT OR OWNERSHIP INTEREST 
IN THE ABOVE-NAMED ESTABLISH-
MENTS OR ORGANIZATIONS, 
Respondents 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
After considering the recommended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order by A. Robert Thurman, Licensed Hearing 
Examiner, and after hearing arguments of Petitioner and Respondent 
at an open meeting on February 23, 1989, being fully advised in the 
premises, and good cause appearing, the Park City Council herein 
enters its Findings of Fact: 
1. Respondents "The Club" and "The Alamo" constitute a 
single business operated in adjoining space, in a single building 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
BY THE PARK CITY COUNCIL 
NO. 88-001 
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located at 449 Main Street in Park City. While the City has issued 
beer and liquor licenses to each entity separately for revenue 
purposes, there is no doubt, and we find, that they are, de facto, 
a single business. 
2. There is no doubt, and we find, that "The Club" and 
"The Alamo" are unregistered, d.b.a's used by Four Forty-Nine Main, 
Inc., a Utah non-profit corporation which is responsible for the 
combined establishment known as both "The Club" and "The Alamo". 
The board of trustees for Four Forty-Nine Main, Inc., is comprised 
of Therese M. Haberkorn (Lawton) , Keith Bronstein, Mike Stemler, 
Ann Allende, Bill Dahlquist, Doug Watchorn and Chris James. 
3. The actual operation of the business known as "The 
Club" and "The Alamo" is performed by Liquid Assets, Inc., a Utah 
for-profit corporation. The Directors of Liquid Assets, Inc., are 
Bill Dahlquist, Chris James and Sonny Sundquist. The officers of 
Liquid Assets, Inc., are Therese M. Lawton, president; Keith 
Bronstein, vice-president; Ann Allende, secretary; and Mike 
Stemler, treasurer. 
4o The Cityfs licensees appear to be both Four Forty-
Nine Main, Inc. and Liquid Assets, Inc., and we so find for the 
purposes of this hearing. The individuals presently associated 
with the management of the business known as "The Club" and "The 
Alamo" are Therese M. Lawton, Keith Bronstein, Ann Allende, Mike 
Stemler, Douglas Watchorn, William Dahlquist, Chris James and Sonny 
Sundquist. 
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5. Four Forty-Nine Main, Inc., leases space in a 
building owned by a partnership called Historic '84-Park City. The 
partners of Historic '84-Park City are William Dahlquist, Carl 
Redlin, Douglas Watchorn and Milton Stemler, each holding a 25% 
interest in the partnership. 
6. Milton Stemler is the father of Mark Stemler, and he 
acquired his ownership interest in the Historic '84-Park City 
partnership, and thus the leased building, through his son. Mike 
Stemler and Ann Allende are the brother and sister, respectively, 
of Mark Stemler. 
7. The original owners of Liquid Assets, Inc., were 
Cindy David and Mark Stemler, each apparently owning 5,000 shares 
of the 10,000 shares authorized. On November 5, 1985, those two 
parties entered into a stock purchase agreement, under the terms 
of which Mark Stemler was to buy Cindy David's interest represented 
by 5,000 shares of stock for $84,000.00, payable $4,000.00 down, 
$6,000.00 on or before May 1, 1986, and the balance in 36 monthly 
installments at four percent (4%). 
8. On July 26, 1986, Mark Stemler plead guilty in the 
federal district court in Wyoming to charges of Conspiracy to 
Distribute Cocaine and Distribution of Cocaine. He was sentenced 
to a ten-year term. He is presently serving his sentence at the 
federal correction facility at Boron, California. 
9. Within days of his arrest on the federal charges, 
from the Wyoming jail where he was being held, Mark Stemler 
telephoned one Keith Bronstein (hereafter "Bronstein"), an employee 
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of Liquid Assets, and suggested Bronstein serve as a nominee during 
Mark Stemler's incarceration—that is, appear as ostensible owner, 
manage the business, and turn it back over to Mark Stemler at the 
end of his term. Bronstein testified that he declined the offer. 
10. According to the testimony of Therese Lawton, nee 
Haberkorn (hereafter "Lawton"), presumably shortly after Mark 
Stemler•s conversation with Bronstein, Mark Stemler called Lawton, 
again from the Wyoming jail. He protested his innocence on the 
drug charges and offered to sell his interest in Liquid Assets, 
Inc., for a sum to be agreed on later, together with an option to 
buy it back at the end of his incarceration for the same amount 
Lawton may have paid him in the meantime. She claims she then 
consulted her father, a CPA, on the purchase, and also sought and 
received legal advice. She is vague as to the advice received. 
11. According to Lawton, approximately six weeks later, 
she got a second call from Mark Stemler, at which time he admitted 
he was guilty of the drug charges. According to Lawton, she became 
angry at Stemlerfs deception, cursed him, and told him she would 
not resell the corporation to him. Lawton testified that they then 
concluded an oral agreement over the phone. The terms of the oral 
agreement, according to Lawton, are as follows: Lawton was not 
required to pay any money down, but she was supposed to pay Mark 
Stemlerfs attorney's fees, such personal bills as Mark Stemler 
designated during the time of his incarceration, including VISA 
bills, and keep up the installment payments to Cindy David; when 
Mark Stemler is released from prison, Lawton is to pay him the 
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difference between $93,000, the agreed-upon purchase price, and the 
expenditures she has made on his behalf in the meantime. 
12. According to Lawtonfs testimony, since that time she 
has carried out the terras outlined in the preceding paragraph. The 
agreement has never been reduced to writing, and no stock share 
certificates have been transferred. 
13. From the record before us, it appears that Mark 
Stemler is currently a 50% shareholder and, therefore, a 50% owner 
of Liquid Assets, Inc. While the Hearing Examiner was convinced 
that Mr. Stemler had orally contracted to sell his interest in 
Liquid Assets, Inc., to Therese Lawton, there is no evidence of the 
consummation of that sale in the record before us, nor is there 
evidence of the consummation of the stock purchase agreement 
between Cindy David and Mark Stemler. We find that the record as 
to the ownership of Liquid Assets, Inc., and Four Forty-Nine Main, 
Inc., is incomplete, and therefore make no finding with regard to 
the ownership of the businesses known as "The Club" and "The 
Alamo". 
14. During the five-month period from November, 1986, 
through March, 1987, Celeste Paquette Bernards (hereafter 
"Bernards"), an officer operating under cover for the Utah 
Metropolitan Narcotics Strike Force, was active in Park City 
investigating illicit drug activities in the area. Her activities 
culminated in the conviction or guilty pleas, under State statue, 
not Park City Ordinance, of a substantial number of persons, among 
whom are certain employees and customers of The Club/Alamo. She 
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stated she concentrated her efforts at The Club/Alamo because she 
found that establishment the easiest at which to make drug 
purchases. She purchased from, or was directed to sellers by 
doormen and other employees or agents of the establishment. 
15. The apparently most egregious drug activity carried 
out on the premises was the handiwork of one Donald Riegelsperger, 
who, during the period in question, as a concessionaire, operated 
the food service on the premises* Both Lawton and Riegelsperger 
testified that they considered him an independent contractor. 
Lawton, however, directly or through Bronstein, exercised several 
indicia of control casting doubt on Riegelsperger's independence. 
At the very least, he was the establishment's agent, and we so 
find. 
16o During the period Bernards was active, Riegelsperger 
was conducting a flourishing retail cocaine business in conjunction 
with the food operation. He employed one Jody Jane Young as a 
waitress, and she served Riegelsperger's entire product line. If 
Riegelsperger was an agent of The Club/Alamo, then obviously Young 
was a sub«agent, and we so find. Both Riegelsperger and Young 
plead guilty to a State charge of drug distribution. 
17. Bernards attempted a drug purchase, ultimately 
aborted, through one Chris James, at that time a bartender at The 
Club/Alamo, and listed as a director of Liquid Assets. James1 
whereabouts are at present unknown; he is no longer employed at The 
Club/Alamo. He has not yet, to date, been convicted on any drug 
charge stemming from Bernards' activities. 
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18. Bernards also purchased drugs from or through Eugene 
Herrera, Chris Pederson# and Bruce Fecteau, all concededly employed 
as doormen on one or more occasions during Bernards1 activity. 
Herrera, Pederson and Fecteau all plead guilty to State drug 
charges• 
19. In addition to the above-named individuals, Bernards 
made a number of drug purchases from or through customers of The 
Club/Alamo she met on the premises. These purchases took place 
both on and off the premises of The Club/Alamo. 
20. The record reflects substantial evidence and we find 
that the operation of The Club and The Alamo have posed a 
significant law enforcement problem in Park City. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Park City 
Council now enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. The City Council has jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter involved in this revocation proceeding. 
2. The Order to Show Cause brought by the City Manager 
is appropriate in form, and all requirements of Park City 
Ordinances regarding the bringing of this Order to Show Cause have 
been met. 
3. The Hearing Examiner in this case has concluded that 
Ordinance 83-16, Section 6.01(b), "was intended to apply when 
licensees are convicted under Section 7.01," and that therefore 
sanctions must be predicated upon a misdemeanor conviction under 
City Ordinance, rather than a felony conviction under State 
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statutes which proscribe the same conduct. The City Council 
rejects this conclusion, for it was clearly not the Councils 
intention to ignore felony convictions of federal or state drug 
crimes occurring on City-licensed premises and take action only on 
misdemeanor convictions. The facts are that three employees of the 
licensee and two agents of the licensee were convicted of or plead 
guilty to felony drug crimes which took place on the licensed 
premises. The Council concludes that those facts constitute the 
grounds for suspension or revocation contemplated by Section 
6.01(b) of Ordinance 83-16. 
4. The Hearing Examiner in this case has concluded that 
"Petitioner, successfully to predicate any revocation upon 
[Ordinance 83-16] Section 6.01(e), bears the burden of proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence that Lawton knew of the drug 
activities uncovered by (Agent) Bernards." The City Council holds 
that Section 6.01(e) provides a basis for license revocation 
separate from that set forth in Section 6.01(b) and does require 
knowledge of the licensee of the proscribed activities of employees 
and agents. The City Council concludes that the evidence does not 
show knowledge by Bronstein or Lawton of the drug transactions 
which took place at "The Club" and "The Alamo" and that there is 
therefore no basis for sanctions based on Section 6.01(e) of 
Ordinance 83-16. 
5. The City Council agrees with the Hearing Examinerfs 
conclusion that had Mark Stemler been found to be licensee, the 
City would have the grounds for license revocation under Ordinance 
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83-16, Section 6.01(d). Given that the Council has made no finding 
as to the ownership of Liquid Assets, Inc., or Four Forty-Nine 
Main, Inc.,the City Council concludes that there exists no present 
basis for revocation or suspension under Section 6.01(d) of 
Ordinance 83-16. 
6. The Hearing Examiner suggests that Ordinance 87-12, 
Section 15(3), which provides that a business revenue license may 
be revoked or suspended by the City Council when the City Council 
finds that "the business is a front for or the site of illegal 
activity,11 requires a showing of intent on the part of a licensee 
to deceive or defraud the public or City. The City Council 
disagrees, and holds that "The Club" and "The Alamo" were the site 
of the illegal activities described in Findings of Fact No.'s 14, 
15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, within the meaning of Section 15 of 
Ordinance 87-12. 
2£D£B 
As is apparent from the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the 
City Council strongly disagrees with the Hearing Examiner's 
analysis of the meaning and application of the City's Beer and 
Liquor Licensing and Business Licensing Ordinances. Nevertheless, 
the City Council acknowledges that it requested that the Hearing 
Examiner make both Findings of Fact based on the evidence presented 
and Conclusions of Law based on application of the facts to the 
City's Ordinances. Based on equitable considerations and on the 
feeling that no useful purpose would be served by levying sanctions 
against the establishments known as "The Club" and "The Alamo", and 
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pursuant to Section 15(1) of Ordinance 87-12 and Section 6.01(1) 
of Ordinance 83-16, the City Council dismisses the Order to Show 
Cause in the instant matter and orders that the temporary licenses 
issued wThe Club" and "The Alamo" be reinstated on the same terms 
and conditions as applied to all other City business and liquor 
licensees. 
CITY COUNCIL OE/PARK PITY 
Hal ~W.~ Taylor / 
Ray ^6hnson/ 
Bradley A.^ l^icn ^ 
Ann HacQuoidi 
Kristen Rogers / 
James Sarfty" 
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APPENDIX B 
P.C. Ordin. 87-12 § 15: 
Any license issued under this ordinance may be 
revoked or suspended by the City Council when the City 
Council finds that: (1) the licensee has filed false or 
fraudulent license tax returns, (2) the licensee has been 
convicted of or plead [sic] guilty to or paid fines or 
settlements in criminal or civil actions brought by the 
State Tax Commission for the collection of, or arising 
from the non-payment of, taxes imposed by the state of 
Utah, (3) the business is a front for or the site of 
illegal activity, (4) the business has been the subject 
of a sufficient number of consumer complaints that it has 
the effect of tarnishing the reputation of other businesses 
within Park City. 
APPENDIX C 
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JAMES W. CARTER, #0586 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
P. O. BOX 1480 
445 MARSAC AVENUE 
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060 
TELEPHONE (801) 649-9413 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: REVOCATION OF BEER 
AND LIQUOR LICENSE AND 
BUSINESS REVENUE LICENSE 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATION, 
Petitioner-Appellee 
v. 
THE CLUB, THE ALAMO, LIQUID 
ASSETS, INC., THE CLUB/449 
MAIN, FOUR FORTY NINE, A NON-
PROFIT CORP., THERESE M. 
LAWTON, KEITH BRONSTEIN, ANN 
ALLENDE, MIKE STEMLER, BILL 
DAHLQUIST, CHRIS JAMES, 
SONNY SUNDQUIST, DOUG 
WATCHORN, AND ANY OTHER 
PERSONS CLAIMING A MANAGE-
MENT OR OWNERSHIP INTEREST 
IN THE ABOVE-NAMED ESTABLISH-
MENTS OR ORGANIZATIONS, 
Respondents-Appellants 
The Motion to Dismiss of Appellee Park City Municipal 
Corporation having come on for consideration before the above-
entitled court; Appellants being represented by David B Thompson 
and Joseph E. Tesch, and Appellee being represented by James W. 
NO. 
FILED * 
ay. 
__JUL 25 J9(W 
Cleri of Summit County 
Ulfi' 
ORDER 
NO. 1 0 2 1 3 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Carter; and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of 
Park City Municipal Corporation's Motion to Dismiss and the 
Response to Appellee's Motion to Dismiss on file herein having been 
reviewed by the Court, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction 
of the appeal for the reason that appellants lack standing to 
appeal and that the issues sought to be raised on appeal herein are 
moot. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Appeal from the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered by the Park 
City Council in a License Revocation Proceeding on file herein be 
dismissed, with each party to bear its/own costs. 
DATED this day of July, 1989. 
BY M E ffiOURT 
lonorable.J. -Donnio Frodorick 
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NOTICE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on July fl-Uh 1989, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to: 
David B. Thompson, Esq. 
Joseph E. Tesch, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
P. 0. Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Anita L. Sheldon, City Recorder 
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APPENDIX D 
) 
JAMES W. CARTER, #0586 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
P. 0. BOX 1480 
445 MARSAC AVENUE 
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060 
TELEPHONE (801) 649-9413 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: REVOCATION OF BEER 
AND LIQUOR LICENSE AND 
BUSINESS REVENUE LICENSE 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATION, 
Petitioner-Appellee 
v. 
THE CLUB, THE ALAMO, LIQUID 
ASSETS, INC., THE CLUB/449 
MAIN, FOUR FORTY NINE, A NON-
PROFIT CORP., THERESE M. 
LAWTON, KEITH BRONSTEIN, ANN 
ALLENDE, MIKE STEMLER, BILL 
DAHLQUIST, CHRIS JAMES, 
SONNY SUNDQUIST, DOUG 
WATCHORN, AND ANY OTHER 
PERSONS CLAIMING A MANAGE-
MENT OR OWNERSHIP INTEREST 
IN THE ABOVE-NAMED ESTABLISH-
MENTS OR ORGANIZATIONS, 
Respondents-Appellants 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
As set forth in the appeal of The Club, The Alamo, et 
al, (hereinafter collectively the Club/Alamo), this action arises 
out of a beer and liquor license and business license revocation 
proceeding initiated by the City Manager of Park City before the 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
NO. 10213 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
City Council of Park City, That proceeding culminated in a 
document styled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order by 
the Park City Council, which was attached to the Club/Alamo1s 
appeal as Appendix A. The Order of the City Council, in its 
entirety, reads as follows: 
As is apparent from the foregoing conclusions of law, the 
City Council strongly disagrees with the Hearing 
Examiner's analysis of the meaning and application of the 
City's beer and liquor licensing and business licensing 
ordinances. Nevertheless, the City Council acknowledges 
that it requested that the Hearing Examiner make both 
findings of fact based on the evidence presented and 
conclusions of law based on application of the facts to 
the City's ordinances. Based on equitable considerations 
and on the feeling that no useful purpose would be served 
by levying sanctions against the establishments known as 
"The Club" and "The Alamo", and pursuant to Section 15(1) 
of Ordinance 87-12 and Section 6.01(1) of Ordinance 83-
16, the City Council dismisses the Order to Show Cause 
in the instant matter and orders that the temporary 
licenses issued to "The Club" and "The Alamo" be 
reinstated on the same terms and conditions as applied 
to all other City business and liquor licensees. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Club/Alamo has brought this appeal "from the findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and order" of the City Council, 
invoking jurisdiction under Park City Ordinance 83-16 § 6.01(m), 
Park City Ordinance 87-12 § 15, or alternatively under Rule 
65B(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Park City Ordinance 83-16 § 6.01(m) provides that "Any 
licensee aggrieved by an Order of the City Council...may maintain 
an action for relief..." [emphasis added]. Park City Ordinance 87-
12 § 15 contains language identical to Ordinance 83-16 regarding 
appeal. Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs 
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extraordinary writs, and provides that "where no other plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained..•under 
these rules...". Subparagraph (b)(2) provides: "Appropriate 
relief may be granted: (2) where an inferior tribunal, board or 
officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction 
or abused its discretion;" 
The Club/Alamo's "appeal" is in reality a prayer for a 
declaratory determination that the City's license revocation 
process is ultra vires and that its ordinances are preempted and/or 
unconstitutional, coupled with the request that this Court rewrite 
the Council's Conclusions of Law. However, the Club/Alamo has 
styled this action as an appeal in order to invoke the Small 
Business Equal Access to Justice Act which provides that a small 
business is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees if 
it "prevails" in an "appeal" of a business regulatory action 
undertaken by the City "without substantial justification" (Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27a-l, et seq.). The actual relief requested by the 
Club/Alamo, however, is declaratory although the Club/Alamo has not 
plead the Declaratory Judgments Act. Park City's Motion to Dismiss 
is entirely in response to the "appeal" of the Club/Alamo and does 
not constitute a substantive response to the statutory and 
constitutional issues raised. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Club/Alamo clearly is not aggrieved by the Order of 
the City Council dismissing the Order to Show Cause. The 
Club/Alamo wants to "appeal" the Council's Conclusions of Law and 
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"appeal" the City's license revocation procedure when neither of 
those matters is appealable. 
Park City's own ordinances and the rules of appellate 
standing, mootness and justiciability disallow appeals by 
prevailing parties. There is simply nothing for the Club/Alamo to 
appeal from. The Club/Alamo lacks standing to appeal because they 
are not aggrieved by the Order of the City Council. Further, this 
appeal is moot and presents no justiciable issues for resolution 
by the court. This appeal should be dismissed with leave for the 
Club/Alamo to raise whatever issues it deems important in a proper 
action. 
POINT I 
The Club/Alamo lacks standing to appeal 
the Order of the Park City Council for the reason 
that thev are not aggrieved 
I n Society of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter, et al, v. Honorable 7. Robert 
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (1987), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
rules of appellate standing. In that case, the court considered 
a petition for an extraordinary writ pursuant to Rule 65B U.R.C.P., 
seeking to overturn an order of the District Court filed by an 
entity not a party to that proceeding. While the facts in the 
instant case are different, the court's ruling with regard to 
appellate standing does apply here. The court held: "Our 
generally stated standing rule is that a Plaintiff must have 
suffered 'some distinct and palpable injury that gives him [or her] 
a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute1" (at 1170). 
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In referring to appellate standing, the court reasoned: 
On appeal, a party whose standing is challenged must show 
that he or she had standing under the traditional test 
in the original proceeding before the District Court, 
[cases cited] In addition, an appellant generally must 
show both that he or she was a party or privy to the 
action below and that he or she is aggrieved by that 
courtf s i udgment [cases cited]. Satisfaction of 
analogous requirements therefore will be necessary to 
demonstrate appellate standing and keep appellate review 
by writ on a par with appellate review by appeal, (at 
1171, emphasis added) 
Based upon its analysis, the court held as follows: 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that to demonstrate 
appellate standing, one using a petition for a writ as 
a vehicle to obtain appellate type review of a trial 
court's ruling, must show the following: (i) the 
petitioner had standing to proceed before the District 
Court, (ii) the petitioner is challenging the District 
Court's ruling adverse to him or her, (iii) the 
petitioner appeared and presented his or her claim to 
that court. If the petitioner fails to establish any one 
of these standing requirements, this court will not 
consider the claims, (at 1172, emphasis added) 
The Club/Alamo has failed to show that it has appellate 
standing because the challenged ruling is not adverse to them. It 
is clear that the Club/Alamo has suffered no "distinct and palpable 
injury" by reason of the Council's dismissal. The Club/Alamo may 
not be pleased by the license revocation proceeding, but they 
simply are not aggrieved by the Council's order. The Club/Alamo's 
actual argument is that the City Council had no constitutional or 
statutorily authorized license revocation procedure in the first 
place, and that commencement of the license revocation proceedings 
was ultra vire, unconstitutional and preempted by state law. Those 
would be an interesting inquiries in a declaratory action but it 
has absolutely nothing at all to do with the appealability of the 
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Council's order. As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Terracor vs. 
Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P. 2d 796 (1986), the issue of appellate 
standing is jurisdictional, and may be raised sua sponte by the 
court even if not plead by the parties. The Order entered by the 
City Council was the order prayed for by the Club/Alamo and 
deprived them, as a matter of law, of standing to appeal it. 
Because the Club/Alamo lacks appellate standing, this court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and it should be dismissed. 
POINT II 
This court should decline jurisdiction because 
the appeal is moot and presents no justiciable controversy 
Quite simply, the appeal of the Club/Alamo is moot. The 
establishments have continued to operate, uninterrupted, from the 
time of the filing of the Order to Show Cause through the present 
date. The Order to Show Cause was dismissed by the City Council 
and the "The Club" and "The Alamo" are presently operating under 
valid and subsisting beer and liquor and business licenses issued 
by Park City. 
There exists a clear judicial policy against giving 
advisory opinions even in declaratory actions. See, for example, 
Merhish vs. H. A. Folsom & Associates, 646 P.2d 731 (Utah, 1982) and Backman vs. 
Salt Lake County, 375 P.2d 756 (Utah, 1962). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Duran v. Morris, 635 P. 2d 43 (1981) , 
held "If the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of 
the litigants, the case is moot and a court will normally refrain 
from adjudicating it on the merits." (at 45) There is nothing the 
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court can do with the Council's order which will affect the rights 
of the litigants except reverse it. Neither party is requesting 
reversal. 
While the parties continue to have a relationship 
governed by the ordinances of Park City, the factual circumstance 
giving rise to the City's Order to Show Cause and the Club/Alamo's 
potential liability have been rendered moot by the Council's 
dismissal. The relief that the Club/Alamo seeks has nothing to do 
with the order of dismissal, but is an attack on the entire license 
revocation process. Such an attack should not be countenanced in 
the guise of an appeal, but should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Club/Alamo has no springboard to launch an appeal of 
the City Council's order because they prevailed. Any citizen with 
standing may challenge the City's regulatory process at any time 
through a declaratory action, but the license revocation 
proceedings are over. The relief requested by the Club/Alamo would 
properly constitute a new cause of action, but not an appeal. Park 
City requests that the court find that it lacks jurisdiction of the 
appeal of the Club/Alamo and that it be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 1st day of June, 1989. 
Jamjes W. Carterr-^ Attorney^  for 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
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